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1. Introduction 
Since Becker’s (1960) influential study on household decision-making and family size, economists have 
taken growing interest in understanding determinants of fertility. One strand of literature concerns the role 
of women labor market opportunities, technological changes, and other socio-economic factors in 
determining the number of children. Another line of inquiry focuses on the impact of wealth on the optimal 
family size.1 However, we are not aware of an empirical work that examines how transfers from parents to 
married children influence the recipients’ fertility decisions. As we show in our theoretical model, the 
fertility consequence of this exogenous change in spouses’ non-labor income goes beyond a pure wealth 
effect and depends on the gender of the transfer-recipient. The purpose of our study is to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
First, following seminal contributions of Chiappori (1988; 1992), and Apps and Rees (1988), we develop 
a simple theoretical model of fertility choice under the standard collective household utility maximization 
framework. We differentiate between the wife’s and the husband’s intrinsic preferences on the quality 
versus the quantity of children (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973). We show that an increase in the 
wife’s transfer-income could improve her bargaining power within the family such that the household 
fertility decision-making better represents the wife’s preferences. Therefore, the optimal number of 
children depends on whether female spouse or male spouse receives parental transfers.   
Second, we utilize a unique Japanese micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka 
University’s 21st Century COE Program “Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments” 
and its Global COE project “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics” to test the predictions of our 
theory. Our results confirm that the effects of transfers from the wife’s parents and that of the husband’s 
parents differ. Transfers received from female-spouses’ parents have a negative effect on the number of 
children, whereas transfers – received or expected – from husbands’ parents have a positive association 
with the number of children. 
                                                     
1 See Section 2 for a detailed survey of the relevant theoretical and empirical studies. 
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Japan, similar to other developed countries, has been facing severe demographic challenges (Ogawa 2003). 
According to an estimate, the old-age dependency ratio can reach 85 percent – the highest among major 
developed economies – by 2050 owing to aging population and low birth rates (Kitao 2015). At the same 
time, Sánchez-Romero, et. al (2013) estimate that the annual flow of bequest as a fraction of output in 
Japan will increase from 4-6 up to 13 percent during 2000-2100. Our analysis implies that government 
policies that affect intergenerational transfers and bequests have consequences on fertility; the direction of 
the outcome depends on the relative share of transfers from spouses’ parents. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature. We introduce the theoretical model in Section 3 followed by the description of data in Section 4 
and the presentation of results in Section 5. Section 6 provides further discussion of results and Section 7 
concludes.   
 
2. Literature Review 
In the following two subsections, we aim to briefly inform the reader about the main theoretical and 
empirical results on the household fertility decisions. We also briefly describe how family decision-making 
is traditionally modelled. Our aim is not to provide an exhaustive summary of the theoretical and empirical 
contributions.2 
 
2.1 A Brief Review of the Conventional Theoretical Studies on the Family Decision-Making 
There are a large number of theoretical models that aim to explain household decision-making. In this 
section we focus on the so-called unitary, cooperative (collective), and non-cooperative frameworks. Under 
cooperative frameworks we also discuss the bargaining models.3  
                                                     
2 For excellent reviews, refer to Bergstrom (1997), Hotz, et al. (1997), Schultz (1997), Ermisch (2003), Browning, et al. (2004; 
2014). 
3 Browning, et. al. (2014, pp. 127-130) review additional approaches, the so-called equilibrium models, separate-spheres approach, 
and inefficient bargaining framework.  
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A typical theoretical assumption that most models share is that decisions are made by “adults-in-charge” 
who have well-defined individual preferences (which may or may not be interdependent) over optimal 
spending. One approach is to assume that family members act as if a unitary household, where individual 
preferences are embedded in a single household utility function. Individual preferences may depend on 
private and possibly public goods but not on income and prices. The stable household utility function is 
then maximized subject to the family resource constraints. A fundamental feature of traditional common-
preference models is that the family aggregate demand satisfies Slutsky regularity conditions,4 and the 
demand depends on total family resources – not on the income distribution within the family. This income 
pooling hypothesis in the context of unitary approach has been subject to many tests and empirical scrutiny; 
yet there have been a number of solid evidences against it.5   
Nevertheless, unitary models conveniently fit empirical cross-sectional data that are primarily based on 
aggregate household information. Suppose commodity prices and total family income do affect household 
consumption, indirect utility is of the Gorman polar form, and preferences in a household are convex. Then 
econometricians who only observe the time paths of the household income, consumption, and commodity 
prices, would not be able to reject the hypothesis that a single consumer makes all household decisions, 
implying that a household acts as if a single utility-maximizer (Bergstrom 1997). In addition, as 
emphasized in Browning, et al. (2014), one person may be given a full control of resources due to customs 
or strong social traditions. Samuelson (1956) and Varian (1984) show that the unitary approach is valid 
under a very general individual preferences as long as income within a family is optimally reallocated by 
a benevolent dictator, and each member of the household is given a certain amount of income to purchase 
an optimal bundle (Bergstrom 1997). 
Evidently, “common preference” models are tractable, easy to interpret, and are not without merit. 
Therefore, the theoretical approaches that share some common features with it are widely popular. Yet it 
is often argued that assuming a many-person household has stable and transitive preferences is not 
innocuous (Browning, et al. 2006). This leads us to another popular strand in the literature, where 
                                                     
4 These are homogeneity, additivity, symmetry and negativity of the Slutsky matrix (Browning, et al. 2014, p. 90). 
5 See, for example, Ermish (2003, pp. 43-49) and the references therein.  
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household decision-making is modelled in the context of the so-called cooperative (e.g., collective) 
framework à la Chiappori (1988; 1992), and Apps and Rees (1988). Within the collective framework, it 
can be shown that the household will achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation of utilities by maximizing a 
member’s utility subject to the family budget constraints and a reservation-utility level of another member. 
In the collective framework, a Lagrange multiplier associated with the reservation-utility constraint (the 
so-called “Pareto weight”), can be a function of income, prices, total expenditures, and variables that do 
not enter individual preferences (“environmental parameters” or “distribution factors”). When that weight 
is always constant, the approach collapses to a standard unitary model. Further, Browning, et al. (2006) 
emphasize that in the presence of private goods, the outcomes of the collective model can be achieved via 
decentralization. The authors systematize the notations to come up with a “hybrid” between a standard 
unitary approach and a standard collective model depending upon what enters the Pareto weight. The 
resulting household market demand may or may not fail the Slutsky conditions and/or be independent of 
any distribution factors. The authors stress that whether the demand satisfies the Slutsky conditions is 
important because it will affect whether the outcomes of a collective framework can be rationalized by a 
conventional household preference function.  
Efficiency concept is a crucial focus of many models of intra-household decision-making, and has often 
been assumed or implied under Samuelson-type single household, or Beckerian “benevolent dictator” 
framework. However, families in some developing countries may not achieve efficient allocation of tasks 
owing to the lack of freedom, biased social norms, and prejudice. Nevertheless, the efficiency argument 
can serve as a reasonable first-degree approximation to reality in modernized developed countries like 
Japan.  
In the context of a broad cooperative framework, the decision-making process can be further specified. A 
significant progress along this dimension is achieved within cooperative game-theoretic bargaining models 
which also presume Pareto efficiency. Assuming that the couple has already formed a union, one can define 
individual preferences for each adult, as well as the “threat points” (or, disagreement payoffs). Distribution 
factors that play a crucial role in a collective framework can also be thought of affecting the threat points. 
It is worth emphasizing that if the threat points are constant then the model is essentially unitary. 
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The solution to the bargaining process, which is typically a Nash solution, leads to the specific point on 
the Pareto frontier. The Nash solution satisfies the requirements of Pareto optimality, symmetry, 
independence of irrelevant alternatives and linear transformations of the utility functions.6 Under certain 
assumptions, this solution rule is consistent with the maximization of the product of the differences 
between the utility function of each agent and its respective threat point.7 The Nash bargaining solution 
involves the maximization of the objective function that contains a product of the utility functions. This 
may complicate solving the household optimization in closed form. Further, Browning, et. al (2014, pp. 
126-127) cautions the reader about additional challenges associated with the nature and type of a threat. 
An alternative theoretical approach assumes a non-cooperative decision process, whereas each adult 
independently maximizes its objective function subject to the resource constraints. In contrast to collective 
and bargaining models, Pareto-efficiency is not guaranteed in a non-cooperative framework. A non-
cooperative allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no direct economic interaction between the agents and 
there are no externalities and public goods. Efficiency can also be achieved under symmetric information. 
Furthermore, Slutsky conditions or income pooling are satisfied only under certain restrictions (Browning, 
et al. 2014, p. 91). Therefore, it is generally more difficult to justify non-cooperative models under the 
assumption of efficient cooperation within a household.8 As stressed in Browning and Chiappori (1998), 
it is reasonable to assume the household members ultimately share a great deal of common information 
about each other’s preferences; due to the repetitiveness of non-cooperative “games” and bargaining 
processes, an efficient allocation can be achieved. The authors thus regard the collective framework as a 
natural “umbrella” for all existing models of cooperative nature.   
                                                     
6 The solution rule is symmetric if for a symmetric bargaining game (where the disagreement payoffs are equal, and the set of 
utility allocations is symmetric and compact), the agreement payoffs of the players, receiving the same disagreement payoffs, 
match. Independence of linear transformations means that the solution rule is invariant to the change of the scale and the units of 
the utility functions. Independence of irrelevant alternatives means that the solution rule remains valid even when the payoff space 
of the original game is restricted to eliminate the undesirable alternatives for the players (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti, 2000, pp. 
190-203; Browning, et al. 2014, pp. 122-127).  
7 A popular alternative to the Nash bargaining rule, especially when the bargaining game is asymmetric, is the Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution rule. 
8 As argued in Browning, et al. (2014, pp. 92-97), in the presence of altruism, a non-cooperative process may display a “unitary-
like” behavior. 
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2.2 A Brief Review of the Conventional Models of the Marital Fertility Decisions 
Earlier studies on the demand for children within married couples adopted a unitary-like approach to 
modelling fertility and treated children as any other normal good within a static neoclassical framework 
(Hotz, et. al. 1997). Under such assumption, the demand for children goes up with the family’s income. 
Since this generally does not jibe with most empirical evidence, many alternatives have been suggested.  
In pioneering studies, Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973), model parental preferences where the 
quantity and quality of children are equally important. The family’s budget constraint is non-linear due to 
interaction of the quantity and quality. The size of the income elasticity of child quality now plays a crucial 
role in the determination of the sign of the comparative statics. As a result, an outward shift in the family’s 
budget constraint may lead to a reduction in the quantity of children and to a rise in the quality of children. 
Intuitively, an increase in the total household income (irrespective of the source) may reduce the family’s 
fertility because of the “induced substitution effect” – i.e., higher desired quality increases the cost of an 
additional child. 
Further studies also focus on other possible sources of the negative relationship between income level and 
family size. For example, Willis (1973) endogenize the wife’s labor supply, as well as her supply of home 
time. The author assumes that raising children is relatively more time intensive activity, thus affecting the 
costs of child quality. Adults’ standards of living and satisfaction from children (“child services”) are 
produced according to the household production function via time contributions and the purchased goods 
and services. The relative cost of raising children depends on children’s quality, and varies directly with 
the opportunity cost of mother’s time. Consequently, the higher female wage would raise the relative cost 
of time-intensive activity thereby reducing fertility despite a positive income effect.  
Alternatively, one can assume that some childcare can be purchased in the market, although such care may 
not be a perfect substitute for the mother’s time (Ermisch 1989; Ermisch 2003, pp. 117-122). Both parental 
time and purchased goods and services are used to deliver a quality component of a child. Consumption 
time of the mother is also used to supply home-produced commodity. When mothers are assumed to work 
sometime, the optimal amount of purchased childcare is chosen such that the marginal benefit of childcare 
matches the ratio of the price of the childcare to the value of the mother’s time. On the other hand, the 
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optimal family size is determined such that the marginal cost of children equals the marginal rate of 
substitution between children and purchased commodities. No childcare may be purchased in the market 
when the mother’s wage is low or childcare is expensive. In this case, an increase in the mother’s wage 
would reduce fertility due to a large substitution between other commodities and children.  
In a recent study, Córdoba and Ripoll (2016) develop a discrete-time, three-period model of fertility choice, 
and introduce altruistic parents who take into account the cost of raising children and the present value of 
the child’s future income. Parents may financially benefit from having children. However, raising children 
is costly due to time costs, goods costs, and bequests. Parents are facing nonnegative bequest constraints 
so that they cannot legally enforce debt contracts on their children. Otherwise, parents might borrow to 
raise children and then leave negative bequests to their children. Higher parental wages are associated with 
higher relative marginal costs of rearing children and this lowers the demand for children. In addition, with 
binding constraints, income-fertility link can be negative when parental consumption is a superior good, 
which means that richer parents are less willing to sacrifice their own consumption for children.  
Alternative dynamic models of fertility consider a wide range of issues, including the determination of the 
optimal timing of births and the spacing between them, and even the optimal contraceptive strategies. Like 
their static counterparts, most dynamic models also incorporate some form of child quality component 
(child services) that can be enhanced via parental time investment and the purchases of specific market 
goods.9 For example, Mira (2007) models a perfect fertility control and infant mortality. It is assumed that 
producing children incurs costs in the form of foregone consumption by mothers net of avoidable 
contraception costs. The model focuses on the fertility response to an unexpected death of an infant with 
corresponding Bayesian learning of the family-specific infant mortality risk. More recently, Canning, et. 
al. (2016), use a dynamic model of labor supply and consumption with endogenous fertility effort by 
women. Fertility effort ultimately determines the likelihood of birth. One of the main findings is that better 
educated women delay the probability of fertility as they prefer to gain work experience earlier. 
                                                     
9 This line of literature is voluminous. An interested reader may refer to Hotz, et. al (1997), Ermicsh (2003), Ueda (2007), and 
Canning, et al. (2016). 
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A number of studies model the enjoyment the household receives from the mother’s leisure time and 
benefits from the mother’s human capital accumulation. The latter can be enhanced via the mother’s 
participation in the labor market. Moffitt (1984) shows that if the opportunity cost of human capital 
accumulation or enjoyment from the mother’s leisure is high earlier in life, the childrearing can be 
postponed. 
Heckman and Willis (1976) focus on the uncertainty due to the imperfect costly contraception control and 
pregnancy. Households receive satisfaction from children and from the consumption of other services, 
while the efficiency of contraception (and thus the probability of conception) is chosen endogenously. This 
leads to precautionary contraception strategy earlier in life. This line of research (see also Wolpin 1984; 
Newman 1988) presumes that there are economic incentives to have children at times when incomes are 
high. Yet between the births, the couple optimally engages in contraception and spaces births. 
Kim (2005) endogenizes abortion decision in a dynamic framework of selective or unselective abortions 
with stochastic conception and imperfect control over pregnancy. Contrary to a popular view that cheap 
sex selection may lower family size (in the absence of wealth effect), the author finds that a reduction in 
the cost of gender selection may increase fertility by expanding the number of sex-selected abortions at the 
expense of unselected abortions.  
Ueda (2007) endogenizes a woman’s labor supply, marriage and childrearing decision within the 
quantitative-theoretical life-cycle model, where marriage is subject to the economy of scale and career 
interruption is costly. The key finding – based on estimated utility gains for the Japanese households – is 
that having the first child generates a utility loss presumably due to a lack of childrearing experience and 
costs of infant-care.  
 
2.3. A Brief Review of the Empirical Literature on the Family Income, Fertility and Children 
A large body of empirical work tested Becker’s predictions on the relationship between household income 
and fertility. Cross-country and country-level evidence suggests that an increase in income lowers family 
size (e.g., Galor, 2011; Strulik and Vollmer, 2015; Wang and Sun, 2016; Weil, 2016). These studies mainly 
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dwell on the factors and dynamics of demographic transitions with an increase in a country’s GDP. 
Studying the fertility pattern for women who were born between 1826 and 1960, Jones and Tertilt (2008) 
find that much of the decline in fertility in the US is explained by income alone.   
On the other hand, several recent studies find support for the positive fertility-income relationship.  
Bruckner and Schwandt (2015) show that population growth increased with increase in income growth for 
139 countries spanning the period 1960-2007. In a micro-level analysis, Black, et. al (2013) examine the 
relationship between income and fertility among non-Hispanic white married women at different age 
groups and socioeconomic characteristics in the US. Their findings suggest that fertility of married couples 
who lived in coal-rich counties increased and that increase was mainly driven by the increase in the 
husband’s income. In addition to the income effect, the concern for old-age support has also shown to be 
a deriving factor in increasing the number of offspring by parents (e.g., Oliveira, 2016). 
A separate line of literature questioned the validity of the unitary theory of household. Thomas (1990) 
argues that if household resources are not pooled, then each parent can allocate different resources to the 
number and health of children. Using a household survey data from Brazil, he finds that non-labor income 
in the hands of the mother has a bigger effect on family health than the same amount of income given to 
the father. Similarly, Schultz (1990) shows that non-labor incomes of men and women have dissimilar 
effect on female labor supply in Thailand. In particular, women with more “bargaining power” increase 
their time in nonmarket activities and prefer to have more children. Duflo (2003) shows that pension 
received by women improve the health and nutrition of girls, while such transfer has no discernible effect 
if it is received by men. Therefore, the consequences of transfer programs for the nutrition of children 
depends on whether husband or wife receives these payments. 
Lower childcare costs may also increase the demand for children as it reduces the net costs of having 
children. Mörk, et. al (2013) examine the impact of Swedish childcare reform that imposed a cap on 
childcare charges. They find that the reduction of childcare costs increased the probability of first births 
for the childless couples by 9.8 percent.  Studying the period 1983-2012 in the US, Hazen and Zoabi (2015) 
show that childcare has become more expensive for women with less than a college degree and cheaper 
for those with a college degree. They find a negative relationship between the probability of giving birth 
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and the costs of childcare; however, highly educated women have more children as they substitute a 
significant amount of their own parenting with childcare. In similar vein, Kremer and Chen (2002) show 
that the fertility differential among educated and uneducated women is greater in countries with more 
income inequality.  Since fertility typically falls with education and children of educated workers are more 
likely to attain education, this fertility differential creates a vicious circle of low wages and low education. 
Likewise, Al-Qudusi (1998) shows a differential in rural-urban fertility rates in Arab countries that largely 
results from a combination of low wages of women and illiteracy rate. 
Given the demographic challenges of aging populations and declining birth rates in developed countries, 
the governments have been encouraging more births by subsidizing the costs of rearing children (Sleebos 
2003). However, efficacy of these programs in meeting such objective is an empirical question. Gauthier 
and Hatzius (1997) argue that the potential effect of any policy intervention to instigate fertility would be 
doubtful if a child bearing decision is perceived to be an entirely a private affair. They find a small positive 
effect of cash benefits on fertility in 22 industrialized countries: a 25 per cent increase in family allowance 
increase fertility by 0.6 and 4 percent in the short-run and the long-run, respectively. This translates into 
0.07 children per women on average. Kim (2014) finds a little positive effect of the Allowance for Newborn 
Children program on fertility in Canada. He also argues that this increase in birth could mainly be due to 
the shift in the timing of childbirth, rather than increase in lifetime fertility level. Fiscal incentives such as 
tax credit for working mothers, tax exemptions for children and family allowances are also found to have 
a significant and positive effect on fertility (e.g., Azmat and Gonzalez, 2010; Milligan, 2005;  Zhang, et. 
al, 1994). 
 
3. A Simple Model of Fertility Choice in a Collective Framework 
We augment the standard collective household utility model that is based on the seminal contributions of 
Chiappori (1988; 1992), and Apps and Rees (1988),10 with the classic quantity-quality of children approach 
developed by Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973). We deliberately keep the model simple in order 
                                                     
10 The framework is thoroughly discussed in Chiappori et al. (1998), and Browning et al. (2014). We will mostly follow the 
terminology and the assumptions used in Browning et al. (2014). 
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not to confound a link between an “unearned” income of the wife (parental transfer received) and the 
decision on the family size. Our approach is consistent with the way a public good consumption choice is 
often modelled within a collective framework (Browning, et al. 2014, p. 160-163; Ermish 2003, pp. 25-
29).11 
We start by assuming that the decisions are made by two agents only: a “husband” (denoted by symbol ܪ) 
and a “wife” (denoted by symbol ܹ). There is only one private good, ݔ, that can be divided between 
husband and wife, such that ݔ ൌ ݔு ൅ ݔௐ. Assume the lifetime income of the husband (ܫு) consists of 
the bequest income (ܤு ൐ 0) received from his parent, and some other income (ݓு ൐ 0), so that 
ܫு ൌ ݓு ൅ ܤு (1) 
Similarly, the lifetime income of the wife (ܫௐ) consists of the bequest income (ܤௐ ൐ 0) received from her 
parent, and some other income (ݓௐ ൐ 0), so that 
ܫௐ ൌ ݓௐ ൅ ܤௐ (2) 
 
Remark 1. A person’s “bargaining power” or “relative importance” can be affected by many factors, 
including those that do not enter individual preferences. As emphasized in Browning, et al. (2006), such 
factors can be interpreted as “extraenvironmental parameters” or “distribution factors”. Browning and 
Chiappori (1998), and Browning, et al. (2006; 2014) cite as possible examples the sex ratio in the relevant 
population (that may impact the likelihood of remarriage), the level of single-parent benefits, the individual 
incomes of the two partners, the intrahousehold distribution of income, the wealth contribution of each 
partner upon marriage, to name a few. Let vector ࢠ capture those distribution factors that may also be 
affected by the wife’s bequest level, ܤௐ. 
                                                     
11 Fisher (2012) also models the fertility decision within a collective framework, with a specific focus on the expenditure on 
children, and the Pareto weight depending on that variable. The author carefully distinguishes the commitment and non-
commitment scenarios, i.e., whether or not the couple can commit to child investment and private consumption with a possibility 
to renegotiate, and investigates the impact of the custody laws on fertility and consumption.    
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Suppose each partner has “egoistic” preferences over his/her own consumption of the goods.12 Associated 
utility functions are assumed to be well-behaved as in Browning and Chiappori (1998, p. 1245). The 
Pareto-efficient allocation can be obtained by maximizing the welfare of, say, the husband, so that the 
welfare of the wife does not fall below a given level, say ഥܷௐ. 
Thus, the problem is to  
maxሼ௡,௤,௫ಹ,௫ೈሽܷ
ுሺ݊, ݍ, ݔுሻ (3) 
subject to 
ܷௐሺ݊, ݍ, ݔௐሻ ൒ ഥܷௐሺ݌௡, ݌௫, ܫ, ࢠሻ (4) 
݌௡݊ ൅ ݌௤ݍ ൅ ݌݊ݍ ൅ ݌௫ሺݔு ൅ ݔௐሻ ൑ ܫு ൅ ܫௐ (5) 
where ܷு and ܷௐ are the respective utility functions of the husband and wife. Note ഥܷௐ may be a function 
of ݌௡, ݌௫, ܫ, and ࢠ, where ܫ ≡ ܫு ൅ ܫௐ. The budget constraint in (5) is consistent with the generalized one 
presented in Becker and Lewis (1973, p. 283), where some costs associated with the number of children 
are not associated with the costs of child quality and vice versa. 13 Here ݌௡ is the price of a child,	݌௤ is the 
price of the independent quality component, ݌௫ is the price of the parental consumption of the private good, 
݌ is the price of ݊ݍ, ݊ is the number of children, ݍ is the quality per child. The interaction term ݊ݍ in the 
budget constraint implies that the cost of an extra child depends on the quality per child and vice versa.  
Now, let the Lagrange multiplier associated with (4) be 
ߤ ൌ ߤሺ݌௡, ݌௫, ܫ, ࢠሻ (6) 
which is nonnegative and continuously-differentiable. If the utility functions are strongly concave, the 
above optimization exercise is equivalent to  
maxሼ௡,௤,௫ಹ,௫ೈሽሼܷ
ுሺ݊, ݍ, ݔுሻ ൅ ߤܷௐሺ݊, ݍ, ݔௐሻሽ (7) 
                                                     
12 We do not explicitly focus on children’s well-being, which is typically modelled as entering parents’ preferences as a public 
good. 
13 For instance, a reduction of the cost of an oral contraceptive pill would raise the marginal cost of a birth but will not affect the 
marginal cost of the child quality.  
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subject to (5).   
 
Remark 2. The coefficient ߤ is called Pareto weight for ܹ, or distribution of power function (Chiappori 
1988, 1992; Browning, et al. 2006; 2014). It is important to re-emphasize that “Pareto weights may depend 
on prices, wages, incomes, and distribution factors and that this fact explains why collective households 
do not generally behave as unitary ones” (Browning, et al. 2014, p. 116). 
 
In what follows, we just assume that 
ߤ஻ೈᇱ ≡
݀ߤ
݀ܤௐ ൐ 0 (8) 
We are not concerned about the exact mechanism that generates (8), which is likely to be at least partly 
shaped by socio-economic and cultural considerations. It may be that an increase in relative total income 
of the wife (ܫௐ ܫு⁄ ) due to a rise in her bequest income is the source of the betterment of her position 
within the household. 
Finally, the preferences of the adults are assumed to be logarithmic in the form of  
ܷுሺ݊, ݍ, ݔுሻ ൌ ߙ௫ுlog ݔு ൅ ߙ௡ுlog ݊ ൅ ߙ௤ுlog ݍ (9) 
ܷௐሺ݊, ݍ, ݔௐሻ ൌ ߙ௫ௐlog ݔௐ ൅ ߙ௡ௐlog ݊ ൅ ߙ௤ௐlog ݍ (10) 
where ߙ-s are all positive, and ߙ௫ு ൅ ߙ௡ு ൅ ߙ௤ு ൌ 1, ߙ௫ௐ ൅ ߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௤ௐ ൌ 1.  
 
Remark 3. We obtained a general solution to (7) under the generalized budget constraint (5), but the 
solutions are extremely lengthy (available upon request). Therefore, we present the solution to the model 
for the special case (݌௤ ൌ 0) considered by Becker and Lewis (1973, p. 284).  
 
When ݌௤ ൌ 0, the optimal number of children are consequently given by  
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݊ ൌ ߙ௡
ு െ ߙ௤ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ െ ߙ௤ௐሻߤሺ݌௡, ݌௫, ܫ, ࢠሻ
݌௡ሺߙ௡ு ൅ ߙ௫ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௫ௐሻߤሺ݌௡, ݌௫, ܫ, ࢠሻሻ ሺܫ
ு ൅ ܫௐሻ (11) 
Differentiating with respect to ܤௐ leads to  
݀݊
݀ܤௐ ൌ
ଵܸ െ ଶܸ ൅ ଷܸ
݌௡ሺߙ௡ு ൅ ߙ௫ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௫ௐሻߤሻଶ (12) 
where 
ଵܸ ≡ ሺߙ௡ு െ ߙ௤ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ െ ߙ௤ௐሻ ߤሻሺߙ௡ு ൅ ߙ௫ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௫ௐሻߤሻ (13) 
ଶܸ ≡ ሺܫு ൅ ܫௐሻሺߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௫ௐሻሺߙ௡ு െ ߙ௤ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ െ ߙ௤ௐሻߤሻߤ஻ೈᇱ  (14) 
ଷܸ ≡ ሺܫு ൅ ܫௐሻሺߙ௡ௐ െ ߙ௤ௐሻሺߙ௡ு ൅ ߙ௫ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௫ௐሻߤሻߤ஻ೈᇱ  (15) 
Note when ߤ஻ೈᇱ ൌ 0,  
݀݊
݀ܤௐ ൌ
ߙ௡ு െ ߙ௤ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ െ ߙ௤ௐሻߤ
݌௡ሺߙ௡ு ൅ ߙ௫ு ൅ ሺߙ௡ௐ ൅ ߙ௫ௐሻߤሻ (16) 
 
Remark 4. It is clear from (16) that if the wife puts a sufficiently strong weight on the quality, and her 
existing bargaining power is sufficiently strong, then the family will still have fewer kids with an increase 
in the wife’s bequest income, i.e., ݀݊/݀ܤௐ ൏ 0. 
 
Thus, to generate a negative relationship between the wife’s bequest income and the family’s fertility, it is 
sufficient that two assumptions hold: 1) wife puts high enough weight on the quality of the children, and 
2) her existing bargaining power within the household is sufficiently strong. Hence, the fertility rate may 
decline even if bequest income produces a negligible (or no) rise in the wife’s Pareto weight. This simple, 
intuitively sensible result is conveniently consistent with the general predictions of the collective household 
models. Thus, when the wife’s bequest income increases, the demand for children tends to increase due to 
pure wealth effect, but this effect can be counterbalanced by the desire to obtain better quality of children. 
The latter effect is even stronger when the wife’s relative power rises as a result. It is possible that an 
increase in the husband’s bequest income does not affect the fertility decision in the same way as an 
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increase in the wife’s bequest income. This ambiguity can also be generated even under the general 
assumption ߤ஻ಹᇱ ് 0. 
 
4. Data Source and Description 
We use Japanese micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University’s 21st Century 
COE Program “Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments” and its Global COE 
project “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics”. The data is based on nationally representative 
annual surveys using visiting and placement methodology. The respondents are selected using two-stage 
stratified random sampling method.14 This study utilizes the survey data from 2010 wave because the 2010 
wave has the most complete information about our main variables of interest. Our sample is restricted to 
2,665 married households that reached completed fertility cycle – i.e., households with female spouse older 
than 49 years old. This allows us to examine the equilibrium effect of our variables of interest on demand 
for children and avoid complications related to dynamics that cross-sectional data would not be able to 
address.  
The dependent variable is the number of children (Number of children). We follow our theory and extant 
fertility literature to identify independent variables. The survey questionnaire asks respondents whether 
they received and/or expected to receive inheritance and/or gifts from their parents. However, the amount 
of transfer is not specified. Using available information, we construct six main explanatory variables. 
Transfer Rec. is a dummy variable that is 1 if a respondent received inheritance and/or gifts from their own 
and/or spouse’s parents. Similarly, Transfer Exp. equals 1 if a household is expected to receive inheritance 
and/or gifts in the future from the husband’s and/or the wife’s parents. The other four dummy variables are 
transfers received from the husband’s parents [Transfer Rec. (H)], transfers received from the wife’s 
parents [Transfer Rec. (W)], transfers expected from the husband’s parents [Transfer Exp. (H)], and 
transfers expected from the wife’s parents [Transfer Exp. (W)]. 
                                                     
14 First, the Japan’s prefectures are grouped into ten regions and then each of the regions is divided into four strata (government-
designated major cities, cities with more than 100 thousands population, cities with less than 100 thousands population, towns and 
villages). 
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The upper panel in Table 1 presents disaggregated information about received and expected parental 
transfers. The data shows a significant variation across various dimensions. For example, 9.3% of sample 
households [100*234/(810+1700)] received transfers from both the husband’s and the wife’s parents, 
whereas 54.2% (1,360 out of 2,510) did not receive any transfers from either parents. The remaining 
households – around 36.5% – received transfers from either the husband’s or the wife’s parents; the number 
of families that received inheritance and/or gifts solely from the husband’s parents and entirely from the 
wife’s parents are 576 and 340, respectively. Approximately 33.4% of households expect to receive 
parental transfers; among them are some who received transfers in the past. Around 9.6% of families (241 
out of 2,498) received transfers from the husband’s parents and expect to receive more from the husband’s 
parents in the future. This figure is about 6% (143 out of 2,484) for households who received transfers 
from the wife’s parents and expect to receive more in the future. 
[Table 1 here] 
We also divide households based on the source of parental transfers and compute the average number of 
children for each group (lower panel in Table 1). Overall, the number of children is greater in households 
that received or expected to receive transfers from male spouse parents than in families that received or 
expected to receive parental transfers from female spouse parents. Further, families that received or 
expected to receive transfers from the husband’s parents have more children than households that did not 
receive (or are not expected to receive) parental transfers from the husband’s parents. However, the 
opposite holds true for transfers from the wife’s parents. 
According to the theoretical model (Section 3), price of children and income of spouses (other than 
transfers) are important determinants of family size in addition to parental transfers. Unfortunately, direct 
measures for price of children and permanent income of spouses are not available. The survey data has 
information about spouses’ employment status for the last two years and earnings for the previous (2009) 
year. However, current employment status is not informative about wife’s opportunity cost of having kids 
at the time of fertility decision, which might have been many years ago for our completed-fertility sample. 
Being employed at current or last year does not necessarily mean that a spouse was regularly employed. 
Similarly, last-year’s income is not a good indicator of long-term earnings. Therefore, we use education to 
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capture these effects. Education, in addition to its direct effect on preferences towards children, can serve 
as a proxy for long-term income and opportunity cost of having children owing to its positive correlation 
with earnings and probability of employment for female spouse. The education variables – Education (H) 
and Education (W) – are indices ranging between 1 (elementary/junior high school) and 11 (doctoral 
degree), where H and W denote husband and wife, respectively. We also construct a measure of wealth for 
the entire household; separate data for spouses are not available. The survey asks respondents to report 
their (present) appraised value of houses and properties, financial assets, housing loans, and debts other 
than housing loans for their households. The respondents are not asked to report the exact amount of assets 
and debts. Instead, they are presented with different ranges of values to choose from. Using this 
information, first we construct indices of property assets and financial assets – each ranging from 1 to 8 
with larger value indicative of greater amount of assets – and aggregate them.15 Second, indices of property 
loans and (other) financial debts are created and summed; each index varies from 1 to 5 with greater value 
signifying higher debts.16 The asset and debt indices have dissimilar ranges because the corresponding 
survey questions are different. Third, our wealth measure – Wealth index – is computed as the ratio of 
aggregated asset index to aggregated debt index. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the amount of wealth 
that is originated from parental transfers. In our analysis, we examine the robustness of transfers’ effects 
with and without wealth variable. Following the fertility literature, we include in our regressions the 
duration of marriage in years (Marriage duration) and a measure of religious beliefs (Religiosity). The data 
for the degree of religiosity is available only for a responding spouse. So we assume that this approximately 
represents the degree of religiosity of both spouses. The religiosity index varies from 1 to 5. The religiosity 
measure is transformed so that the higher values indicate a stronger degree of religiosity. The summary 
statistics of the variables are shown in Table 2. The number of observations varies across variables owing 
to missing values. 
                                                     
15 The ranges for each index are as follow: 1 (less than ¥5,000,000), 2 (between ¥5,000,000 and ¥10,000,000), 3 (between 
¥10,000,000 and ¥15,000,000), 4 (between ¥15,000,000 and ¥20,000,000), 5 (between ¥20,000,000 and ¥30,000,000), 6 (between 
¥30,000,000 and ¥50,000,000), 7 (between ¥50,000,000 and ¥100,000,000), and 8 (more than ¥100,000,000).  
16 Each index takes the following values: 1 (zero debt), 2 (less than ¥5,000,000), 3 (between ¥5,000,000 and ¥7,500,000), 4 
(between ¥7,500,000 and ¥10,000,000), and 5 (more than ¥10,000,000).  
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[Table 2 hear] 
 
5. Results 
Our dependent variable is a count of children in a given household. Poisson and negative binomial 
estimators are two commonly used approaches for modeling count data. We apply Poisson regression since 
our data does not exhibit a serious overdispersion problem; negative binomial estimator also produces 
similar results (available upon request). The data is cross-sectional at the household level. Robust standard 
errors are computed to account for potential heteroscedasticity. 
In Table 3, Model 1 includes total parental transfers received and total parental transfers expected, Model 
2 incorporates only received transfers decomposed by gender, Model 3 contains only expected transfers 
decomposed by gender, and Model 4 encompasses received transfers and expected transfers – each 
decomposed by gender. Model 5 re-estimates Model 4 by entering wealth index. 
[Table 3 here] 
The effect of received parental transfers, though not statistically significant, is negative whereas the impact 
of expected parental transfers is positive. Decomposed analysis, however, reveals a rather nuanced picture. 
On average, a household that receives transfers from the wife’s parents is expected to have fewer children 
compared to a household that does not receive transfers from the wife’s parents (Models 2, 4, and 5). 
Transfer receipts from the husband’s parents have a positive, albeit non-robust, effect on the number of 
children. We perform the Wald test and confirm that the effect of the husband’s parental transfers received 
statistically differs from the impact of the wife’s parental transfers received. This central finding of our 
study coincides with our theoretical prediction that transfers from the wife’s parents boost her intra-
household bargaining power. Having command on financial resources increases the wife’s say in deciding 
the number of children she may desire to have.  In our model, a female-spouse’s desire to have fewer 
children arises from her preference for quality, rather than quantity, of children.  This argument is 
consistent with the findings by a several studies suggesting that women care more about the health and 
nutrition outcomes of their children than men (e.g., Duflo, 2003; Thomas, 1990). With regard to anticipated 
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parental transfers, transfers expected from the wife’s parents have no statistically significant effect on the 
number of children. Hence, only received transfers from the wife’s parents – not expected transfers – 
influence her relative bargaining power. The effect of expected transfers from the husband’s parents is 
positive and statistically significant. 
The impacts of control variables are generally in accordance with the findings in literature. The duration 
of marriage, as expected, has a positive effect on the number of children. The degree of religiosity is also 
important; households with a stronger degree of religiosity are likely to have a greater number of children. 
The estimated coefficient for the index of wealth is negative and statistically significant; other things 
constant, wealthier households have fewer children presumably by opting for higher quality. The remaining 
explanatory variables are either not statistically significant or not robust. 
[Table 4 here] 
Next, we examine the magnitude of the effects – see Table 4. Families that expect to receive transfers from 
the husband’s parents, have 5% more children. However, households that received transfers from the wife’s 
parents, on average, have 5% fewer children. The mean values of received transfers from the wife’s parents 
and expected transfers from the husband’s parents are both around 0.24 with standard deviations of 0.43. 
Table 5 reports predicted counts of children for families that did not receive parental transfers, received 
transfers from one of the spouses’ parents, and received transfers from both spouses’ parents. The 
differences in predicted counts are statistically significant; the exception is the difference between 
households that did not receive any parental transfers and those that received transfers from both spouses’ 
parents. Families that received transfers only from the husband’s parents are predicted to have the greatest 
number of children at 2.16, whereas households that received transfers only from the wife’s parents are 
expected to have the fewest number of children at 2. Note that the average number of children in our sample 
is 2.09 with standard deviation of 0.83 (Table 2). 
[Table 5 here] 
A one-unit increase in the wealth index reduces the expected number of children by about 1%; this 
translates into almost 4% reduction in the number of children in response to one standard deviation (3.9) 
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increase in the wealth index. In Figure 1, we plot the predicted number of children at different values of 
the wealth index separately for households that receive parental transfers from the wife’s parents and 
households that do not receive such transfers. The predicted count of children is statistically significant, 
based on 95% confidence interval, for all possible values of the wealth index. As the wealth index 
increases, the predicted count reduces; hence, wealthier households are predicted to have fewer children. 
At every level of wealth, households that received transfers from the wife’s parents have fewer children. 
We also calculate the marginal effect of wealth for all possible values of the wealth index – see Figure 2. 
The marginal effect of wealth is negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect, 
however, becomes less negative as the wealth index increases. At every level of wealth, the marginal effect 
is smaller in absolute term (less negative) for households that received transfers from the wife’s parents. 
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
  
6. Discussion 
The results imply that only received transfers influence the relative bargaining power of a female spouse 
thereby reducing the number of children. Families that received transfers from the wife’s parents, on 
average, have 5% fewer children. Expected parental transfers are not statistically significant when they 
originate from the wife’s side. These results are at variance with positive effects of the husband’s parental 
transfers – expected and received – on the number of kids. 
The estimated coefficients of parental transfers are biased by reverse causation if the number of children 
determines whether a family receives transfers. Such consideration may arise from the likely concern that 
parents can be more empathetic towards children who have larger families as they may require more 
financial resources to fulfil their needs. Unfortunately, we do not have good instruments to address this 
issue. However, past studies do not provide any solid evidence to support this conjecture (e.g., McGarry, 
1999; Wilhelm, 1996). Nevertheless, there is a reason to believe that our qualitative result for the wife’s 
parental transfers is not affected. In fact, our estimate might be conservative. It is reasonable to assume 
that households with more children are more likely to receive parental transfers, other things hold constant.  
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Even if this actually is true, our estimates of transfers would be positively biased. Notice that the estimated 
effect of received parental transfers for female spouse is negative, which implies that the true effect would 
also be negative. In terms of magnitude, the true effect would be larger in absolute value. However, a 
positive simultaneity bias leads to overestimation of the estimates of husband’s parental transfers. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our theoretical model of fertility choice predicts dissimilar effects of the wife’s and the husband’s parental 
transfers on family size. The empirical outcomes – based on Japanese data of married households with 
completed fertility cycle – strongly support this hypothesis. The received transfers from the wife’s parents 
have a negative effect on the number of children. In contrast, both expected and received transfers from 
the male-spouse’s parents are positively associated with family size. The dichotomous nature of our 
transfer variables does not allow us to examine the magnitude of the impact of the amounts of transfers; 
this important issue merits further investigation. However, our findings indicate that government policies 
that influence parental transfers have consequences for fertility and the direction of the outcome depends 
on the relative share of transfers from the spouses’ parents. 
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Table 1 Parental transfers and the average number of children  
 Transfer Rec. (H) Transfer Exp. (W) 
 Yes No Yes No 
Transfer Exp. (H)   
 Yes 241 357 164 422 
 No 571 1329 249 1666 
 Total 812 1686 413 2088 
Transfer Rec. (W)      
 Yes 234 340 143 439 
 No 576 1360 272 1630 
 Total 810 1700 415 2069 
   
 Transfer Rec. (H) Transfer Rec. (W) 
  Yes No Yes No 
Average number of children 2.15 2.06 2.02 2.10 
      
  Transfer Exp. (H) Transfer Exp. (W) 
  Yes No Yes No 
Average number of children 2.12 2.07 2.06 2.08 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of children 2606 2.09 0.83 0 5 
Transfer Rec. 2645 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Transfer Exp. 2573 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Transfer Rec. (W) 2565 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Transfer Rec. (H) 2590 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Transfer Exp. (W) 2535 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Transfer Exp. (H) 2539 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Marriage duration 2589 33.77 9.22 1 56 
Wealth index 2301 4.70 3.90 0.13 16 
Education (W) 2605 3.60 1.66 1 10 
Education (H) 2610 4.25 2.30 1 11 
Religiosity 2665 1.95 1.13 1 5 
Notes: H stands for husband and W denotes wife. 
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Table 3 Poisson regressions 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Transfer Rec. -0.013  
 (0.016)  
Transfer Exp. 0.044**  
 (0.019)  
Transfer Rec. (W)  -0.053*** -0.047**  -0.047** 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Transfer Rec. (H)  0.022 0.021 0.031* 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Transfer Exp. (W)  0.005 0.010 0.001 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) 
Transfer Exp. (H)  0.052** 0.049**  0.053** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Marriage duration 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Wealth index  -0.011*** 
  (0.002) 
Education (W) 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Education (H) -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Religiosity 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.015* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant 0.491*** 0.515*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.432*** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.057) 
   
N 2381 2337 2323 2256 1990 
Notes: Significance levels: *** is <.01, ** is <.05, and * is <.10.  Huber/White robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
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Table 4 Poisson regressions: Incidence rate ratios 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Transfer Rec. 0.987  
Transfer Exp. 1.045**  
Transfer Rec. (W)  0.949*** 0.954**  0.954** 
Transfer Rec. (H)  1.022 1.022 1.032* 
Transfer Exp. (W)  1.006 1.010 1.001 
Transfer Exp. (H)  1.053** 1.050**  1.055** 
Marriage duration 1.006*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.006*** 1.008*** 
Wealth index  0.989*** 
Education (W) 1.006 1.009 1.009 1.008 1.014** 
Education (H) 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.997 1.001 
Religiosity 1.019** 1.020*** 1.021*** 1.020*** 1.015* 
Constant 1.634*** 1.674*** 1.628*** 1.628*** 1.541*** 
   
N 2381 2337 2323 2256 1990 
Notes: Significance levels: *** is <.01, ** is <.05, and * is <.10. 
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Table 5 Received parental transfers and predicted count of children   
Predicted 
count 
 p-value 
  
Differences in 
predicted count 
 p-value
No transfers 2.091  0.000 
 
No Transfers - Husband's parents 
only 
-0.067  0.080 
Husband's 
parents only 
2.158  0.000 No Transfers - Wife's parents only 0.096  0.024 
Wife's 
parents only 
1.995  0.000 
 
No Transfers - Both spouses' parents 0.032  0.554 
Both 
spouses' 
parents 
2.059  0.000 
 
Husband's parents only - Wife's 
parents only 
0.162  0.007 
    
 
Husband's parents only - Both 
spouses' parents 
0.099  0.025 
    
 
Wife's Parents only - Both spouses' 
parents 
-0.064  0.079 
Notes: Predicted counts are based on the Poisson regression – see Model 5 in Table 3 for specification.  
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Figure 1 Predicted number of children (with 95% confidence intervals). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Marginal effects of wealth on the number of children. 
 
 
